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1 Introduction
A central authority in a vertically integrated company has by definition joint profit
maximization as its goal. That definition, however, says nothing on whether all deci-
sions in integrated companies should be taken at the central authority level. Actually,
it is widely recognized that some decisions should be delegated to a de-centralized au-
thority level. The theoretical underpinnings of this so-called delegation principle are
described in the industrial organization (IO) literature, where a principal may benefit
from hiring an agent and giving him/her the incentive to maximize something other
than the welfare of the principal.1 These precommitment gains have been shown to
exist even if one allows for renegotiation of the contract between the principal and the
agent (Caillaud et al., 1995).
A multinational enterprise (MNE) is an integrated, global profit maximizing company
and as such it also faces the choice of delegating some authority to its subsidiaries.
Whether it does so or not depends on institutional and structural issues that are
specific to the MNE activity that we focus on. For example, for the case of R&D
activities, there exists a large literature that both documents and explains the extent
of de-centralization that takes place within MNEs.2
Our paper contributes to the literature on the degree of (de-)centralization in MNEs
by drawing attention to the importance of corporate tax diﬀerences across countries
as determinants of MNEs’ delegation decisions. The general implications of such tax
diﬀerences are a central theme in the public finance literature on MNEs.3 It is well
known in that literature that a MNE uses transfer prices to shift profit to low tax
1See e.g. Vickers (1985), Sklivas (1987), Fershtmann and Judd (1987), and Katz (1991).
2See e.g. Grandstrand et al. (1992), Almeida (1996), Papanastasiu and Pearce (2005) for empirical
evidence, and Petit and Sanna-Randaccio (2000), Sanna-Randaccio and Veugelers (2002) for theoret-
ical considerations.
3The international taxation of MNEs is based on the so-called Separate Accounting tax system.
Under this system, each country can tax the profits of the firms that operate within its borders. This
requires that the MNE accounts for the profits that its entities make in each country of operation.
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jurisdictions.4. Our paper shows that the incentive to use transfer prices to save tax
payments can counteract the strategic delegation incentive, rendering the centralization
vs. de-centralization choice of a MNE a function of the tax diﬀerential.
In presenting our argument as clearly as possible, we choose a simple model where
the absence of tax diﬀerentials leads the MNE to delegate some authority to its sub-
sidiaries. While the subsidiaries are delegated the authority to choose output and sales
levels, the MNE centrally decides the (transfer) price a subsidiary will have to pay for
its input purchases. Assuming that the subsidiary operates in a market with Cournot
competition, such a decision structure will lead to a higher market share in the sub-
sidiary’s market, and thus to higher joint profits. This is exactly the essence of the
delegation principle: by introducing a pre-commitment device (here, a low transfer
price), the centralized authority can induce the de-centralized authority to take global
profit maximizing actions.5
Tax diﬀerentials, however, can alter the story: If the subsidiary faces suﬃciently higher
taxes, then earning high (pre-tax) profits in that country due to a strategically set low
transfer price will not be profit-maximizing for the MNE anyway. A high and not a low
transfer price is needed to shift profits out of the high-tax country. But the high transfer
price inevitably interferes with the market share game of the subsidiary. Consequently,
a reconsideration of the delegation decision is called for, and possibly the resolution is
centralization in lieu of de-centralization.
In fact, it is straightforward to show that the outcome of the delegation decision be-
comes an endogenous function of the tax diﬀerential. In our example, small tax diﬀer-
entials lead to de-centralization, while large tax diﬀerentials (with the subsidiary taxed
more heavily) will lead to centralization.
We recognize that the issue that we describe above arises due to the fact that there is
one instrument (the transfer price) addressing two targets (minimizing tax payments
4Weichenrieder (1996) studies European multinationals and their transfer pricing behavior, and
Hines (1999) surveys the literature on U.S. multinational behavior.
5Our product market competition set-up resemples that of Sanna-Randaccio and Veugelers (2002),
who also compare the centralized and de-centralized profits in a model with R&D choices.
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and providing a strategic advantage to the subsidiary). A solution may be to introduce
an instrument other than the transfer price, e.g. a monetary incentive to the manager
of the subsidiary firm, and assign each instrument to a particular target. While such a
procedure could be possible, it does not eliminate the fact that transfer prices do have
multiple and sometimes conflicting roles. Our choice of model is motivated exactly
by our desire to bring out this conflict and relate it to the MNE’s de-centralization
decision.
There exists some relevant literature on the eﬀect of taxes on aMNE’s setting of transfer
prices. Mintz and Elizur (1996) model the transfer price as a tax-minimizing instrument
and as an instrument to influence the decisions of a self-maximizing manager in the
subsidiary company. However, by imposing a transfer pricing rule, i.e. by fixing the
transfer price to a level acceptable to the tax authorities, they focus mostly on the
second attribute of transfer prices and how tax competition aﬀects the MNE. More
closely related papers are Schjelderup and Sørgaard (1997) and Zhao (2000), where
the transfer price takes on the same dual role as in this paper, i.e. both as a strategic
device and as a tax-minimizing instrument. However, in both papers delegation is
taken as given and is not a matter of choice. In a related paper, Nielsen et al. (2003),
we also assume delegation, but point out the possibility that delegation may not be
profit maximizing when tax diﬀerences are large. In the present paper we examine this
particular issue in detail.
2 The model
Consider a MNE that operates in two countries: country A, where the parent firm is
located, and country B, where the subsidiary firm is located. The parent produces a
product that is sold directly to the consumers in country A, and is also sold to the
consumers in country B through the subsidiary firm, which here takes the form of a
retailer. The market in country A is assumed to be monopolistic, while the market
in country B is characterized by Cournot competition between the subsidiary and a
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local firm.6 To simplify but without impact on the qualitative insight of our results, we
assume that demand in both countries is linear and all production costs are constant
and normalized to zero. Based on these assumptions the firms’ profits (absent taxes)
are the following:7
ΠA = (1−QA)QA + qQB (1)
ΠB = (1−QB −Q∗B)QB − qQB (2)
πB∗ = (1−QB −Q∗B)Q∗B (3)
The quantity sold in country i (i = A,B) is denoted byQi, while an asterisk (∗) denotes
variables for the local competitor in country B. The transfer price is denoted by q. As
is seen, the parent firm has revenues from selling directly to country A’s consumers
and to the subsidiary in country B (while the costs of producing QA and QB are zero
by assumption). The subsidiary’s revenue depends on the sales of the local competitor,
while its costs are determined by the transfer price which it has to pay to the parent
firm. Finally, the foreign local firm has revenues from selling in its local market (while
the costs of producing Q∗B are zero).
Accounting for taxes, the MNE maximizes after-tax global profits, while the local
competitor maximizes its after-tax local profits ΠB
∗
. In each country there is a company
tax (tA, tB) that falls on the profits of the firms that operate within the country, i.e.
taxation is based on the separate accounting system.8 It is also assumed that in the
case where the transfer price deviates from its true (arm’s length) value of zero, the
MNE faces a non-tax-deductable transfer pricing cost.9 We assume that this cost is
quadratic and based on the actual diﬀerence between the chosen price and the true
6This set-up is the simplest possible to portray the strategic considerations involved in setting
transfer prices. None of the qualitative results that we present here depends on the Cournot assumption
(except for the sign of the transfer price under de-centralization).
7Since for our purpose there is no need for general intercept and slope parameters in demand
expressions, we take all of them to be unity.
8In addition, we assume that the exemption principle of international taxation is in force, so that the
subsidiary’s income is not liable to tax in the parent’s country. In essence, this requires the subsidiary
to be a separate legal entity.
9These costs can be thought of as real resource costs that the MNE pays to experts (lawyers,
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price (which is zero here), viz. q2/2.10 That is, if the transfer price is not zero, the
MNE incurs costs that are an increasing function of the deviation from zero.11
We proceed by examining, in turn, a centralized and a de-centralized decision struc-
ture of the MNE. The option of centralization implies that the MNE chooses both
its transfer price, output and sales simultaneously (subsection 2.1). We derive the en-
dogenous variables and find the centralized MNE’s profits as a function of tax rates
tA and tB. We then examine the de-centralization option (subsection 2.2), where the
MNE chooses centrally only its transfer price, while its entities choose output and
sales decentrally. Again we derive the endogenous variables and find the de-centralized
profits as functions of tA and tB. We then compare the MNE’s profits in the two equi-
libria (subsection 2.3) and determine the eﬀect of the tax diﬀerential on the MNE’s
organizational structure, viz. centralization or de-centralization.
2.1 Centralized choices
This is the case where the MNE chooses centrally all its decision variables in order
to maximize after-tax global profits (ΠC , where superscript C denotes centralized). In
doing so, the MNE takes into account the Cournot competition in country B and the
cost of transfer price distortion. The maximization problems of the centralized MNE
accountants) in order to argue to authorities for the particular level of the transfer price chosen. One
can also perceive these costs as an expected penalty that tax authorities impose on distorted transfer
pricing.
10Including a convex transfer price is necessary in order to obtain an internal solution for the transfer
price (see Kant, 1988, and Haufler and Schjelderup, 2000).
11One might argue that transfer pricing costs/penalties should depend not only on the extent of
transfer pricing distortion, i.e. the diﬀerence between q and 0, but also on the volume of the intra-firm
transactions QB and/or on the actual tax rates ti. The implications of diﬀerent transfer price penalty
schemes are an interesting topic in itself that has only rarely been touched upon; see Nielsen et al.
(2004). Here, however, alternative formulations of the cost/penalty scheme have no qualitative eﬀect
on the issue which we examine. Thus, we choose to proceed with the simple quadratic transfer pricing
cost function.
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and its competitor in country B are:
max
q,QA,QB
ΠC = (1− tA)ΠA + (1− tB)ΠB −
1
2
q2
max
Q∗B
ΠB
∗
= (1− tB)πB
∗
Deriving the first order conditions we get:12
q : q = (tB − tA)QB (4)
QA : QA =
1
2
(5)
QB : (tB − tA)q + (1− tB)(1− 2QB −Q∗B) = 0 (6)
Q∗B : Q
∗
B =
1−QB
2
(7)
Substituting (4) into (6) we derive:
(tB − tA)2QB + (1− tB)(1− 2QB −Q∗B) = 0, (8)
which we then solve together with (7) to derive the equilibrium values for the Cournot
quantities and the transfer price:
QB =
1− tB
3(1− tB)− 2(tB − tA)2
(9)
Q∗B =
(1− tB)− (tB − tA)2
3(1− tB)− 2(tB − tA)2
(10)
q =
(1− tB)(tB − tA)
3(1− tB)− 2(tB − tA)2
(11)
It is immediately seen that in the case where the tax rates are equal in the two countries
(tA = tB), the choice variables take on the anticipated values, i.e. the transfer price will
be set equal to the true price (q = 0) and QB = Q∗B =
1
3
, the standard expressions for
Cournot duopoly quantities.13 However, when tA 6= tB, the tax-manipulation incentive
12From (5) we see that the sales in country A are independent of taxes and transfer prices. This is
due to the assumption of constant marginal costs which eﬀectively separates the two sales decisions.
13The intuition behind setting q = 0 is easy to grasp when one notices that the parent firm avoids
double marginalization issues by charging the retailer a wholesale price equal to the marginal cost of
production.
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enters. Starting from equal tax levels we can show that dQB
dtB
¯¯¯
tA=tB
< 0 and dq
dtB
¯¯¯
tA=tB
>
0, i.e. when taxes become higher in the foreign country (B), then the MNE will reduce
sales in that country by overinvoicing in the internal transaction.
Evaluating total centralized profits ΠC = (1− tA)ΠA + (1− tB)ΠB − 12q2 at the equi-
librium choices QA, QB, q gives:
ΠC =
(1− tA)
4
+
(1− tB)2
£
2(1− tB)− (tB − tA)2
¤
2
£
3(1− tB)− 2 (tB − tA)2
¤2 (12)
For tA = tB = t, we get
ΠC = (1− t)(1
4
+
1
9
). (13)
2.2 De-centralized choices
We now consider the case where the MNE chooses its transfer price centrally, but
decentralizes production and sales decisions to its entities. In order to depict the benefits
from pre-commitment, we first consider production and sales decisions given a fixed
transfer price.
From the maximization problems maxQA Π
A,maxQB Π
B,maxQ∗B Π
B∗ , where the profits
are defined in (1)-(3), we derive the following equilibrium sales choices:
QA =
1
2
(14)
QB =
1− 2q
3
(15)
Q∗B =
1 + q
3
(16)
which are the standard monopoly, respectively Cournot duopoly sales choices.
However, the transfer price q is determined centrally by the (headquarters of the) MNE
which can behave strategically. Maximizing ΠDC = (1− tA)ΠA+(1− tB)ΠB− 12q2 with
respect to q, we derive:
q =
4tB − 3tA − 1
13 + 8tB − 12tA
(17)
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In the absence of tax diﬀerentials tA = tB = t, the above becomes:
q =
t− 1
13− 4t < 0
that is, the strategic delegation eﬀect alone leads to underinvocing. This is exactly what
we should expect in our Stackelberg-Cournot equilibrium.14 Setting a low transfer price
makes the subsidiary sell a larger quantity. The competitor anticipates this and its best
response is to limit its own sales.15
We now move on to calculate the de-centralized profits ΠDC . Using (1), (2), (14), (15)
and (17), gives:
ΠDC =
1− tA
4
+
1− tB
9
+
(4tB − 3tA − 1)2
18 (13 + 8tB − 12tA)
(18)
For tB = tA = t the above expression reads
ΠDC = (1− t)
µ
1
4
+
1
9
¶
+
(t− 1)2
18(13− 4t) (19)
In what follows we compare the MNE’s (after-tax) profits under centralization and
de-centralization, stressing the intuition for our results.
2.3 Comparing centralized and de-centralized profits
For equal taxes, and by comparing (13) and (19), it is straightforward to see that
de-centralized global profits are always higher than centralized profits. In particular,
ΠDC − ΠC = (t−1)
2
18(13−4t) > 0 for t ∈ (0, 1). This is exactly as expected: without any tax
14This strategic delegation eﬀect is absent in the centralized equilibrium. Due to it, we expect the
de-centralized transfer price to generally be lower than the centralized transfer price, even in the face of
tax diﬀerences. For realistic tax levels, i.e. 0 ≤ ti < 1, our simulations indeed confirm this conjecture;
see figure 2 below.
15By observing the low transfer price the local competitior anticipates the subsidiary’s production
decision and, thus, reduces its own quantity. Observability of the transfer price may seem like a strong
assumption. However import prices, for example, are public information in many countries due to
the calculation of duties and tariﬀs. Furthermore, the MNE has an incentive to make this type of
information publicly available. Katz (1991) discusses observability issues in delegation.
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saving incentive, pre-commitment to a low transfer price provides a credible incentive
to expand sales in the subsidiary’s market, and thus win the market-share game in that
country. Thus, de-centralized decisions are more profitable than centralized decisions
in the absence of tax diﬀerences.16
However, for unequal taxes, the result of the comparison becomes ambiguous and a
function of the specific tax levels in the two countries. The incentive to save tax pay-
ments works against the strategic eﬀect of transfer prices, in which case it is not obvious
that the firm should make use of its delegation opportunity. A simple numerical exam-
ple is suﬃcient for illustrating and providing the main intuition.
Setting tB = 0.3 in (12) and (18) and allowing tA (t in the figure) to vary, we obtain
the following picture:
0.18
0.2
0.22
0.24
0.26
0.28
0.3
0.32
0.34
Profit
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6tax
Figure 1: Centralized vs. de-centralized profits
The bold/red curve depicts the de-centralized profits, while the thin/green curve depicts
the centralized profits. The two profit functions are equal at t∗A ' 0.208. For tA < t∗A,
centralized profits are higher than de-centralized profits, while the opposite holds for
tA > t
∗
A.
16Clearly, this result rests on the fact that there is oligopolistic competition in the foreign country.
Altering the competition assumption can certainly eliminate the result, making centralized decisions
at least as profitable as de-centralized decisions.
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Performing a similar exercise for the transfer price functions (11) and (17), we get the
following picture:
-0.2
-0.15
-0.1
-0.05
0
0.05
0.1
(q)
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6t
Figure 2: Centralized vs. de-centralized transfer prices
As expected the de-centralized transfer price (bold/red curve - y-axis) is always below
the centralized transfer price (thin/green curve) (see footnote 14).
To explain what is happening in the Figures, note first that, as discussed above, equal
taxes entail that the MNE always chooses a de-centralized decision structure. However,
if the tax in the subsidiary’s home country is higher than the tax in the parent’s country,
i.e. tB = 0.3 > tA, the MNE will want to underinvoice in order to save tax payments
abroad. Thus, the tax saving incentive dictates a high transfer price, while the strategic
delegation eﬀect favors a low transfer price. As tA falls, the desire to save tax payments
strengthens; unfortunately, doing so interferes with the market-share game that the
subsidiary is involved in. The result is that at some point it becomes unprofitable to
use the transfer price as an instrument to implement de-centralized decisions. In our
example, this point is reached at tA ' 0.208. Below this tax level it is more profitable
for the MNE to exclusively focus on saving tax payments, and the way to accomplish
this is to eliminate the de-centralization option and instead choose sales in a centralized
manner. In a sense, the problem of the conflicting roles of the transfer price is resolved
by moving all decisions to the central level.
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Having explained the intuition for the case of a Cournot duopoly, we can now briefly
address the eﬀects of alternative assumptions. First note that if the duopoly in the
foreign country was characterized by Bertand competition and diﬀerentiated products,
then the MNE would have an incentive to set a high transfer price. The intuition is
that the Bertrand competition is too intense to start with, and a high transfer price
enables a higher price for the subsidiary’s product (as well as that of the competitor).17
A high transfer price will not interfere with the tax saving incentive as long as the tax
in the foreign country is higher than the tax in the parent’s country. When tB > tA,
the two concerns of the MNE are not in conflict with each other, and de-centralization
is clearly to be preferred. The conflict, however, will arise if tB < tA, where tax saving
demands a low transfer price and strategic delegation (under Betrand competition
with diﬀerentiated products) requires a high transfer price. Beyond a certain critical
value of the tax diﬀerential, centralized decisions will become more profitable than de-
centralised decisions. A figure similar to figure 1 can still be drawn for this case. It will
feature a profit’s curve for de-centralization which will lie above the profit’s curve for
centralization for all values of tA to the left of some intersection point at a value t∗A,
which itself lies to the right of tB = 0.3.
The number of competitors in the foreign market also has an intuitive eﬀect on our
results. Assuming a larger and fixed number of firms in country B, or a free entry and
exit Cournot game, will reduce the profits that strategic delegation can provide to the
MNE’s subsidiary. Reducing theses profits weakens the strategic delegation incentive,
making it less worthwhile to use transfer prices for that purpose. Centralization, al-
lowing clear focus on tax manipulation, will be more profitable than de-centralization,
even for small tax diﬀerentials.18
To sum up, de-centralization allows the MNE to aggressively pursue competition in the
17If the two companies’ products were homogeneous and they competed in Bertrand fashion, then
the strategic motive for setting the transfer price would vanish.
18Similar intuition can be applied to the case of assymetric production costs. Further, the importance
of the strategic transfer price motive and thus the precise break-even point between centralization and
de-centralization obviously hinges on the exact demand conditions in country B.
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subsidiary’s market, but only halfheartedly manipulate its tax payments. Centraliza-
tion allows full devotion to tax manipulation, but no strategic pre-commitment in the
subsidiary’s market. The size of tax diﬀerentials determines how important pursuing
a tax saving strategy is and therefore the most appropriate decision structure of the
MNE.
3 Conclusions
AMNE’s choice of organization of its decision making is complex and depends on a host
of considerations. The theoretical guidelines on this issue are laid out in the principal-
agent theory of the firm, where it is widely recognized that de-centralization of decision-
making oﬀers a number of advantages to the firm (the precommitment/delegation
argument). In this paper we focus on this de-centralization choice, but in addition
we underline an issue, namely national tax diﬀerentials, which is specific to MNEs as
they operate in diﬀerent tax jurisdictions.
We argue that tax diﬀerentials have an important bearing on whether a MNE chooses
to make all its decisions at the central level or not. By emphasizing the centralization vs.
de-centralization decision as a choice that the MNEmust make in its eﬀorts to maximize
profits, we have shown that while small tax diﬀerentials favor de-centralized decisions,
large tax diﬀerentials may render centralized decisions preferable. In modeling this
issue, we choose to focus on the conflicting roles that transfer prices can have within a
MNE, and on how centralizing decision-making can help overcome these problems.
An important assumption in our analysis is that the transfer price addresses two targets
(minimizing tax payments and providing a strategic advantage to the subsidiary). At
the face of it one might think that one solution could be to introduce an instrument
other than the transfer price, e.g. a monetary incentive to the manager of the subsidiary
firm, and assign each instrument to a particular target. Alternatively, two transfer prices
could address the tax saving and the strategic incentive separately. We would, however,
like to stress that neither of these two suggested schemes would eliminate the problem
at hand namely that any transfer price set-up has two conflicting roles. To understand
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why, consider the case where the parent firm exports goods to its foreign subsidiary
at a (transfer) price, using the transfer price as a strategic pre-commitment device. At
the same time the parent charges the subsidiary an overhead charge and this takes on
the role of shifting profit to the low tax country. Such a scheme is in violation with the
OECD transfer pricing guidelines, which state that any transfer (cost or income) must
reflect real activity between the parties.19 Thus, the size of the overhead charge must
be related to the size of export (i.e, real activity between the two parties). Eﬀectively
then the same problem arises as in the case of a single transfer price. This is the legal
tax reason for why the transfer pricing problem in essence can be compounded into
a single transfer price transaction, where the transfer price must deal with conflicting
incentives.
Finally, whether or not MNEs in reality change their organizational structure in re-
sponse to tax diﬀerentials is an empirical issue that is certainly worth pursuing. Our
theoretical arguments (albeit based on a number of assumptions) entail that MNEs may
be less likely to delegate decision-making to subsidiaries which are located in countries
with either very high or very low tax rates, depending on the nature of competition for
local market shares. It would be interesting to see whether this tendency can be found
in the data.
19OECD 1979/1985.
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